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Abstract
Multi-year budget frameworks are often considered as instruments for controlling 
spending, including in the context of the European Union. This paper shows that the 
effects of multi-year budgeting depends on several conditions, some of which, may 
lead to more rather than less spending. The analysis is based on a model of a finance 
minister’s decision to enforce a previously accepted budget ceiling in subsequent 
negotiations with a spending minister. The analysis takes account of uncertainty 
about preferences in these negotiations, positive transaction costs to the finance min-
ister, and the possibility of political mediation through the prime minister. The find-
ings of this paper show that compliance with budget frameworks improves under 
temporarily stable preferences (e.g. the absence of external shocks), more homog-
enous preferences within the government (e.g. majoritarian governments in contrast 
to coalition government), preference similarity between the finance minister and the 
prime minister (in case of mediation), and increasing transaction costs. In other cir-
cumstances, multi-annual frameworks will not be able to block any upward pressure 
on expenditures.
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Multi-year budgets   are broadly seen as a way to reduce the upward pressure on 
government expenditures during budget negotiations (Anderson and Minarik 2006). 
Various countries, including Sweden (Ljungman 2007), the Netherlands (Bos 
2008), New Zealand, and the United States, use multi-year or multi-annual budgets 
or budgetary caps to control government expenditure. Separating the choice of the 
overall budget from the choice of budget allocations is expected to constrain subse-
quent distributional choices. This budgeting framework fits into a broader literature 
that indicates that institutions affect economic and fiscal policy outcomes (Persson 
et al. 1997; Persson and Tabellini 2003, 2004; Von Hagen and Harden 1995; Volk-
erink and De Haan 2001; Hallerberg et  al. 2009; Blume and Voigt 2013; Caruso 
et al. 2015; Efendic et al. 2011).
Less clear is why multi-year expenditure guidance will provide a ‘binding’ ceil-
ing on annual expenditures. This concern is reflected in a recent analysis by the 
European Commission. Based on a review of all national budgeting procedures in 
the EU, the Commission recommends that member states strengthen their national 
medium-term budgets by introducing ‘more binding elements’ (European Commis-
sion 2012: 6). In other research, Reuter (2015: 77) finds that for 11 EU member 
states in the period 1994–2012 “…that countries comply with their fiscal rules only 
in half of the years.” Concerned about the increasing budget deficits in the euro-zone 
is also evident in the Fiscal Compact, which requires member states to introduce “…
provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional, or 
otherwise guaranteed to be fully respected and adhered to throughout the national 
budgetary processes” (Article 3.2).1
Compliance with expenditure rules, especially when these rules do not generate 
outcomes that are preferred by the main political actors, is a problem that lies at the 
heart of budgetary politics.
In this paper, I analyze the extent to which multi-year budgets are sensitive to 
renegotiation. That fact that political actors have agreed to specific budget ceilings 
does not necessarily imply that they will abide by or enforce these ceilings later on. 
For example, changes in preferences may generate pressure to change the initial 
agreement.
In this paper, such changes are introduced as an external shock that affects pol-
icy preferences. After a shock, ministers choose the actual budget for a ministry in 
view of the status quo budget based on the multi-annual framework. The interac-
tion between the finance minister and a spending minister is modelled as a game in 
which the spending minister makes a proposal, which needs to be accepted by the 
finance minister. The base-line version of this model shows that compliance with 
budget ceilings only occurs when the finance minister prefers the budget ceiling to 
the proposal made by the spending minister. In all other circumstances, players will 
1  Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union of 2 March 
2012, which came into force on 1 January 2013. Available at https ://eur-lex.europ a.eu/legal -conte nt/EN/
ALL/?uri=celex :42012 A0302 (01).
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accept a higher budget leading to noncompliance with the previously adopted budget 
ceiling, and, possibly, an overall budget deficit.
The base-line model is further developed by looking into three different ways of 
creating greater compliance with a multi-year budget. First, uncertainty about the 
finance minister’s preferences is introduced, so that the spending minister does not 
know for sure what the finance minister wants. This change only impacts outcomes 
when the finance minister already wants more spending. Second, positive transac-
tion costs are introduced reducing the finance minister’s incentive to change. These 
costs result into more compliance by making the finance minister less responsive to 
alternative budget proposals from the spending minister. Third, the prime minister is 
introduced as a third player, who can mediate between the other two players, espe-
cially when a conflict about the proposed budget allocation is sufficiently ‘scaled up’ 
to be of interest to the prime minister. The impact of this arrangement depends on 
whether the finance minister and prime minister have similar preferences and work 
in tandem. If they do, it helps improving compliance. If they do not, and the prime 
minister is for instance from a different political party, his involvement may have the 
unintended effect of reducing compliance.
The results show that the use of multi-annual budgetary frameworks allow for 
a range of different outcomes, including ones in which players deviate from a pre-
viously accepted budget and agree to spend more. Compliance to budget frame-
works is conditional and depends on factors discussed in this paper. For example, 
the magnitude of the external shock plays a role. While a ‘small’ shock may not 
change much, a ‘substantial’ shock has more impact and leads to more instances of 
noncompliance.
To develop and present these findings, the paper is organized as follows: After 
discussing the literature on multi-annual budget frameworks (Sect. 2), the analysis 
starts with the base-line model (Sect. 3). To analyze how compliance with budget 
frameworks can be improved, the first step is to introduce uncertainty (Sect. 4). The 
next step is adding positive transaction costs showing how these costs may affect 
decision-making (Sect.  5). Finally, political is included through prime minister 
involvement (Sect. 6). Section 7 concludes the paper.
2  Budgeting rules, politics, and budgets
The question about compliance with multi-year or multi-annual budgets—terms 
which are used interchangeably in this paper—can be related to the classical prob-
lem of the endogeneity of rules to preferences. If rules are an expression of actors’ 
preferences, then changes in preferences will also affect these rules. Riker (1980), 
who first noted this problem, therefore defined rules as ‘relative’ constants suggest-
ing that the likelihood of changing them are lower than for preferences. This likeli-
hood can be a function of various factors including the occurrence of specific prefer-
ences or costs.
Riker’s idea has two, closely related implications for multi-annual budget frame-
works, like the ones used in the context of the EU and many European countries. 
The first implication is that the effectiveness of budget frameworks, conceived as a 
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set of expenditure rules, is conditional on the political context within which budget-
ary decisions are made. Frameworks will not always have the same, constant impact. 
The second implication is that for some preference configurations or high levels of 
costs, budget frameworks will be binding and can be used to constrain budgetary 
decision-making. However, beyond some point, the initial agreement will no longer 
be supported, leading to noncompliance and change. This paper shows the condi-
tions under which compliance and noncompliance with budget frameworks will 
occur.
Empirical studies on the use of budget ceilings, with the balanced budget require-
ment as its most restrictive type, highlight this problem of compliance (see for 
example Von Hagen 1991; Canova and Pappa 2006; Von Hagen and Wolff 2006). In 
her review of these studies, Eslava (2011: 662) concludes that “…numerical targets 
seem to have limited effectiveness”.
With regard to how the institutional context of the decision-making process 
may affect these results, Von Hagen (2006: 48) distinguishes between bargaining 
between actors on equal footing (‘contract’ approach) and situations in which the 
finance minister, on behalf of the government, needs to broker a deal with each of 
the individual spending ministers (‘delegation’ approach). In both cases, the results 
seem to be dependent on the relative ‘power’ of actors.
Concerning a ‘contract’ approach, Von Hagen (2006) finds that the responses 
of EU member states to the constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact 
vary per country. Especially in smaller countries, spending levels as well as deficits 
seem to be reduced, suggesting that national compliance with these rules might be 
inversely related to the power of countries in the Union’s main institutions.
This paper extends analysis of what may be called a ‘delegation’ approach to 
national budgets. Von Hagen and Harden (1995) develop a model analyzing the 
trade-offs between spending and taxation for national governments and their spend-
ing ministers. They show that a finance minister with strong powers in the budget 
process may reduce the impact of spending ministers bending the outcome towards 
a ‘collectively’ optimal budget. Hallerberg et al. (2009: 28–31) report a similar find-
ing using a model in which the finance minister has strong proposal power.
However, it is not yet clear how such divisions of authority affect multi-year 
budgeting and subsequent possibilities for renegotiation. When budget ceilings devi-
ate more from the preferences of the participating ministers, the pressure to change 
the initial agreement will increase, and spending ministers within the government 
may conspire to obtain a higher budget. Furthermore, when the finance minister is 
also a politically motivated actor—which mostly is the case—the assumption from 
previous work that she acts as a ‘benevolent agenda setter’ can also be questioned. A 
finance minister with substantive preferences will no longer impose a Pareto optimal 
‘solution’ for the government as a whole but attempt to advance her own interests or 
that of her party instead.
In this paper I do not assume a strong finance minister who acts as behalf of ‘the’ 
government but focus on budget negotiations in which individual preferences, deci-
sion-making rights, information and the sequence of play all affect outcomes. Start-
ing with a model in which preferences and authority both have effects, I will show 
how introducing uncertainty, adding costs to the finance minister’s utility function 
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and changing the sequence of play affect equilibriums in which budget ceilings are 
respected or not.
3  Multi‑year budgeting as a game
Multi-annual budgeting frameworks separate decisions on budget ceilings from 
ones on the annual allocations to ministries (Kraan 2008). The budgetary process, 
in this context, starts with a decision on the government’s overall expenditure ceil-
ing, which is translated into ceilings per policy area or ministry. These ceilings are 
determined well in advance. This can be done at the start of a government’s term 
(for instance as part of a coalition agreement, or the inaugural declaration of a new 
government) in case of a ‘fixed’ framework, or by including for each year a future 
fiscal year (for instance, including in each year the agreement for t + 4) in case of a 
‘rolling’ framework. By making a choice about the size of the overall government’s 
budget well before the annual negotiations about a ministry’s budget, this procedure 
attempts to disconnect the choice of size from a choice of mix—and so reduce what 
some have termed the fiscal commons problem. Subsequent annual negotiations 
are then ‘reduced’ to decisions on ministry budgets within the ceilings previously 
established.
The annual negotiations focus on the estimates provided by the spending minis-
ter supporting his proposed budget. Since the finance minister will initially stick to 
the budget ceiling as the maximum feasible estimate, the spending minister makes 
the ‘first offer’. This estimate describes the expected financial consequences of the 
implementation of current policy, including new elements approved by the legisla-
ture. Shortfalls in spending, changes in the way public services will be delivered, 
and new policy can be reasons for proposing higher estimates.
In the aggregate of all estimates have to match be equal or less than the ceiling to 
keep the spending minister in compliance with the government’s fiscal agreement. 
The finance minister monitors the spending minister’s proposal and will engage 
in negotiations using the ceiling as the status quo budget. The choice of the status 
quo for multi-annual budgeting therefore differs from classical studies on budgeting 
(Fenno 1966; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1988) in which a constitutionally prescribed 
‘reversion rule’ is often used (Romer and Rosenthal 1978: 30). Multi-annual budg-
eting can be seen as a two-step process. First, an agreement on budget ceilings is 
worked out, and, second, at a later date, fitting actual budgets are chosen, based on 
proposed budgets by spending ministers. Compliance is the extent to which the rel-
evant government decision makers (players) maintain the agreed budget ceiling in 
the actual budgets.
3.1  Players, preferences and sequence of play
In developing this game, I start with an extended game in which players set a multi-
annual budget framework in the first period This framework provides budget ceil-
ings for each spending ministry for a number of years. The ceilings serve as the 
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status quo ante for subsequent rounds of decision-making. After agreement to that 
budgetary framework, I assume that some random external shock occurs. This shock 
affects government revenues and/or the relative prices of government output thus 
shifting the players’ preferences (as reflected by their ideal positions).2 Although 
players may know the ideal positions of the other players in the first period, they 
are not aware of their utility functions. Consequently, any shock causes uncertainty 
about preferences and may change ideal positions.3 In the second round, players 
negotiate over the annual budget appropriation based on the previously accepted sta-
tus quo ante budget, q.
The uncertainty caused by an external shock implies that the first-round agree-
ments may no longer be acceptable to all of the ministers that had signed off on it in 
the first period. It also allows us to focus on the second round of the game. In this 
‘reduced’ game players decide on the annual budget.
The players are the spending minister, s, and the finance minister, f, with ideal 
positions at S and F, respectively. The sequence of play in period two (in which 
budgets are ultimately decided) is that in the first stage the spending minister makes 
a proposal and submits it to the finance minister. In the second stage the finance 
minister reviews the proposal and decides whether to enforce the status quo ante. 
The finance minister’s action set is v = {1,0}, that is, accept or reject (e.g. veto) the 
proposal. I also assume that rejection imposes a very small cost on the spending 
minister.
The budgetary space will be represented with a one-dimensional outcome 
space X =  R.4 The preferences of a player i are defined by a utility function ui(.), 
which is single-peaked at I and satisfies the single-crossing property.5 Define i(q) 
as player i’s indifference point to q. The preference set of the spending minister 
is P = {x|us(x) >  us(q)} and for the finance minister W = {x|uf(x) >  uf(q)}. Define 
x* = min(|S − x|) for x∈P∩W and P∩W ≠ ∅, which is a point with the smallest dis-
tance to S from the intersection of P and W.
3  In the second round of the game the ideal position of a player i is linked to the one in the first round 
as follows: I2 = I1 + ui(ξ) with ξ as the external shock and I. as player i’s ideal position. Since function ui 
is private knowledge, the ideal position I2 will not be known to player j ≠  i. Also note that uncertainty 
about the magnitude of ξ is sufficient to cause uncertainty about ideal positions.
4  Although the model is specified for a one-dimensional outcome space, the main results also apply 
to a more dimensional space. The only difference is that in a more dimensional outcome space more 
instances of compromising and accommodating finance minister types exist, making a straightforward 
objection against a budgetary shift, as the guardian type does, less frequent. Since using a more dimen-
sional space will make the presentation of the main argument more complex, I prefer, facing this trade-
off, the simpler presentation.
5  In other words, these functions satisfy for two players i and j the condition dui/dx < duj/dx for I <  J.
2  Recall that single peaked preferences, as used in spatial models of political decision-making, are based 
on the presumption of given prices and income. See, for example, Cullis and Jones’ (1992: 98–9) discus-
sion of this connection. A change of one of these parameters will shift the ideal points to another position 
along the substantive policy dimension.
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3.2  Comparing outcomes: a base‑line model
To compare the outcomes of the various models, I use a simple base-line model 
in which players do have information about their preferences. To simplify the pres-
entation of outcomes, the spending minister is assumed to prefer spending levels 
equal to or higher than the agreed budget ceiling (that is, S ≥ q). This preference 
configuration allows us to focus on compliance with the framework: if all players 
prefer a spending level lower than q, they will obviously comply with the ceiling 
imposed by the framework. In this game, the finance minister accepts the offer when 
x∈W. Knowing this, and if the spending minister wants to deviate from q, he needs 
to select an offer from W as well as P. Depending on preferences, two equilibriums 
(with an optimal proposal of s and a veto-reply from f) can be distinguished: (q, 1) 
if W∩P = ∅ with equilibrium outcome q, or (x*, 1) if W∩P ≠ ∅ with outcome x*.6 
The possible equilibriums of this game lead to an important observation:
Result 1 (Budgetary compliance) The finance minister maintains the budget ceiling 
q when this point divides the finance and the spending ministers (i.e. F ≤  q).
Result 1 has an interesting corollary. The moment the basic condition of this 
result is no longer satisfied, the players may decide differently:
Corollary (Probability of noncompliance) When the finance and spending ministers 
both prefer a higher budget, budget ceiling q may not be maintained.
Whether and to what extent players will deviate from the budget framework will 
be further explored in this paper.
The outcomes of the base-line game are illustrated in Fig. 1 in which the status 
quo ante, q, and the spending minister’s ideal position, S, are fixed. The solid line 
represents the equilibrium outcome for different preferences of the finance minis-
ter, while the dotted line indicates the location of the status quo ante. For guarding 
finance ministers (that is, F ≤  q) the budget ceiling is well protected as the solid line 
indicates. Only for more ‘activist’ finance ministers (that is, F >  q) will both play-
ers agree to adjust the budget ceiling. Here two different kinds of finance ministers 
may exist.7 The first type is compromising, that is, the finance minister is willing 
to accept intermediate solutions that are satisfactory for the spending minister as 
well (or q <  F <  w). The second type is accommodating (F ≥ w), which is a rather 
unlikely class of preferences for a finance minister (see also Matthews 1989: 351). 
6  Note that, for S ≥   q, W∩P  =  ∅ if F ≤   q∧S ≥   q, which is the condition of result 1. Otherwise, 
W∩P ≠ ∅, which occurs if F,S >  q. For F,S >  q, x* equals S if S ≤  f(q), or f(q) if S >  f(q). These condi-
tions imply that optimal offers are selected from the interval (q, f(q)].
7  The critical point, w, which turns a compromising type into an accommodating one, equals the point 
at which a finance minister, having a preference like this, is indifferent between the spending minister’s 
ideal position S and the status quo ante q. For symmetrical utility functions, w = ½(q + S).
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The accommodating finance minister no longer constrain the spending minister and 
is willing to provide a substantial amount of additional funds.
The outcomes for the base-line model show that for compromising and accom-
modating types’ compliance with the multi-annual framework is reduced. These 
deviations, based the finance minister’s higher spending preferences, are indicated 
by the grey surface in the figure. Comparing these surfaces between different games 
gives an indication of the change in compliance with the framework.
4  The impact of uncertainty: shielding preferences
A first step to explore whether budgetary compliance can be improved is by intro-
ducing uncertainty. If the spending minister is not sure about the finance minister’s 
preferences, will this have an impact on compliance? To answer this question, I use 
a signaling model. As before, the spending minister drafts a budget proposal, that 
will be reviewed by the finance minister, but the question is what does the finance 
minister really want?
To model the spending minister’s uncertainty, I first amend the utility function 
for finance minister f to uf(., t), which is now dependent on her type t. To simplify 
the argument in this paper, I assume that the finance minister can be of one of two 
types, t∈{1, 2}, which are associated with different views on how current policies 
within the jurisdiction of the spending ministry translate into new budget estimates. 
These types only differ in terms of ideal position: one type prefers a relatively ‘high’ 
value on the outcome dimension, while the other type prefers a ‘low’ value, that is, 
F1 >   F2. Working with two types captures the idea that a spending minister may 
have a broad idea about what the finance minister wants but has difficulty specify-









Fig. 1  The outcome of the base-line game for different preferences of the finance minister (F)
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more spending.8 Both types can be based on the guardian (g), compromising (c) or 
accommodating (a) preferences distinguished before (see Fig. 1). Second, since the 
spending minister is not sure about the type of finance minister, beliefs, µ, are added 
to the model. Prior to the budgetary process these beliefs of the spending minister 
are defined by a probability function p, which assigns a strictly positive probability 
to each of the possible types. Let p denote the probability that the minister is of type 
1, so (1 − p) gives the probability that the minister is of type 2; let µ(Ft|κ) denotes 
the conditional probability that the finance minister has ideal position Ft given the 
release of signal κ.
The game starts with a communication κ by the finance minister, in which she 
clarifies how the budget framework will be applied. After this communication, the 
game will have two next stages as before in which the spending minister may adapt 
his beliefs and proposes an estimate, and the finance minister decides whether to 
accept the estimate. Focusing on equilibriums in pure strategies, an equilibrium in 
this game is described as an optimal combination of a communication by the finance 
minister κ, beliefs of the spending minister about the finance minister’s type µ, a 
proposal for a budget estimate by the spending minister x, and the finance minister’s 
decision on the estimate v, or briefly (κ, µ, x, v).
Based on the three categories of finance minister types, a total of six different 
combinations of types may occur (see Table  1). Although for each combination 
one or more equilibriums in pure strategies exist, not all equilibriums are equally 
interesting from a strategic point of view. For some combinations, like having two 
guarding types (combination I), the spending minister does not need to update his 
beliefs, since both types favor the same action, that is, sticking to the budget ceiling 
(as indicated by Result 1).9 This kind of preference is often associated with a finance 
minister, but other, more generous preferences could be possible and should not be 
ruled out. The opposite occurs when both types are accommodating (combination 
Table 1  Possible combinations of finance minister types for F1 >  F2 and S >  q 
F1:











Accommodating (a) – – VI
{a,a}
9  For combination I or {g,g}: with communication κ  =  q, s can only propose x =  q, irrespectively of µ, 
which will not be vetoed (i.e. v = 1) by f, leading to equilibrium (q, µ, q, 1) with outcome q.
8  Of course, there are many more ways of modeling uncertainty and using types. The analysis in this 
paper shows only a limited impact on compliance. Moving to continuous types or adding features such as 
signaling costs to the calculus may not lead to more promising results.
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VI): having rather generous preferences, which are signaled, the finance minister 
does not constrain the spending minister, which successfully proposes his most pre-
ferred budget estimate.10 In other combinations, the finance minister reveals her type 
because hiding her preferences will lead to a less preferred outcome. So, if one of 
the finance minister types is guarding (as in combinations II and III in the table), it 
will lead to an equilibrium in which both types reveal their preference.11
Only combinations for which F2 is compromising may provide the finance min-
ister with the opportunity to take advantage of the lack of certainty about her type. 
Let’s first focus on what happens when both types are compromising: in this case 
both types are willing to accept proposals of the spending minister up to f2(q) as 
indicated in Fig.  2a. Interestingly, since type F1 prefers f2(q) to f1(q), there is no 
reason for the finance minister to reveal her true preferences. She has an incentive 
to strategically communicate a preference other than her true one. Consequently, the 
communication in the first stage does not provide any useful information about the 
preference of the finance minister. The spending minister is not able to distinguish 
both types and relies on his prior belief about what type the finance minister is. His 
response is mainly the result of whether the expected utility of obtaining outcome 
f1(q) or q outweighs the benefits of proposing the more ‘conservative’ budget f2(q). 
If the spending minister wrongly guesses that the finance minister is type F1, the 
proposed budget will be rejected (by the true type F2), leading to outcome q.12
(A) Two compromising types











Fig. 2  Two compromising types of the finance minister
10  For combination VI or {a,a}: with communicate κ =  S, s will propose S, irrespectively of µ, which 
will not be vetoed by f, leading to equilibrium (S, µ, S, 1) with outcome S.
11  For combination II or {g,c}: the communication reveals the type so, (q, µ(F2|q) = 1, q, 1) with out-
come q, or (f1(q), µ(F1|f1(q)) = 1, f1(q), 1) with outcome f1(q); For combination III or {g,a}: similar to 
{g,c} but now (q, µ(F2|q) = 1, q, 1) with outcome q, or (S, µ(F1|S) = 1, S, 1) with outcome S.
12  For combination IV or {c,c}: no separating equilibrium exists: note that q < F2 <   F1  <  w, so 
q <   F2 <   f2(q) < f1(q) < S; since uf1(q) =   uf1(f1(q)), uf1(f2(q)) >   uf1(f1(q)) indicating that the condition 1 
cannot be satisfied. Both types communicate κ =  f2(q); based on prior beliefs µ, s believes that f is of type 
F1 or F2, leading to:
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When type F2 is compromising but F1 is accommodating, conditions exist under 
which an accommodating finance minister may reveal her true preferences, leading 
to a separating equilibrium. Note that the spending minister will release proposal 
x =  S when he thinks that the finance minister is a lenient, accommodating type (in 
case of a compromising type, the proposal will be f2(q)). In deciding about whether 
to reveal her true preferences, the finance minister compares the possible outcomes 
x =  S and f2(q). Only if the finance minister f1 (weakly) prefers the proposal of the 
spending minister, x, to the conservative estimate f2(q), separation will occur. Or,
This condition is satisfied when F1 ≥   v.13 An example of such a configuration 
is illustrated in Fig. 2b, in which the accommodating finance minister F1 is closer 
to S than f2(q). In equilibrium, a finance minister of this type communicates κ =  S, 
which makes the spending minister infer that F1 =  A, setting µ(F1|S) = 1. The opti-
mal response is a budget estimate x =  S, which will not be vetoed (v = 1). Alterna-
tively, if the finance minister communicates κ =  f2(q), the spending minister infers 
that F2 =   C and adapts his prior beliefs to µ(F2|f2(q)) = 1. To avoid rejection, the 
spending minister proposes x =  f2(q), which is accepted.
If condition 1 is not satisfied, the finance minister does not have an incentive to 
reveal her true preference, forcing the spending minister to rely on his priors. This 
is, for instance, illustrated with an accommodating finance minister with preferences 
F1* in Fig.  2b. Both types will communicate a ‘compromise’ proposal κ =   f2(q), 
which does not provide the spending minister any information about their type. The 
spending minister will use his priors to propose a budget.14
The analysis suggests that uncertainty may sometimes support the finance 
minister in constraining the spending minister. For compromising and accommo-
dating types, for which separation does not apply, equilibrium outcomes will be 










14  For F1 < w′, there is no separation: since q < F2 < w  ≤  F1 < w′, q < F2 < f2(q) < S  ≤  f1(q), and since 
F1 < w′, uf1(f2(q)) >  uf1(S). In that case, s decides based on her priors leading to:
  – (f2(q), µ, f2(q), 1) with outcome f2(q) if p.us(S)+(1 − p)us(q) < us(f2(q));
  – (f2(q), µ, S, 1) with outcome S if p.us(S)+(1 − p)us(q) ≥ us(f2(q)) and uf(S) ≥  uf(q) (e.g. F is indeed 
F1); or.
  – (f2(q), µ, S, 0) with outcome q if p.us(S)+(1 − p)us(q) ≥ us(f2(q)) and uf(S) < uf(q) (e.g. F is F2).
  – (f2(q), µ, f2(q), 1) with outcome f2(q) if p.us(f1(q))+(1 − p)us(q) < us(f2(q));
  – (f2(q), µ, f1(q), 1) with outcome f1(q) if p.us(f1(q))+(1 − p)us(q) ≥ us(f2(q)) and uf(f1(q)) ≥  uf(q) (e.g. F 
is indeed F1); or,
  – (f2(q), µ, f1(q), 0) with outcome q if p.us(f1(q))+(1 − p)us(q) ≥ us(f2(q)) and uf(f1(q)) < uf(q) (e.g. F is 
F2).
Footnote 12 (continued)
13  w′ is the point at which an actor is indifferent between S and f2(q). For symmetrical utility functions, 
w′ = ½(f2(q) + S). Based on this condition, we observe for{c,a} and F1 ≥ w′, that there is separation: note 
that q < F2 < w ≤  F1 < w′, so q < F2 < f2(q) < S ≤ f1(q); and since F1 ≥ w′, uf1(S) ≥ uf1(f2(q)). The equilib-
rium is:
  – (f2(q), µ(F2| f2(q)) = 1, f2(q), 1) with outcome f2(q), or.
  – (S, µ(F1|S) = 1, S, 1) with outcome S.
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(the outcome for an accommodating finance minister in Fig. 2a). Figure 3 illus-
trates these outcomes. In this figure the ‘lower’ preference of the finance minister 
(F2) is fixed, while the minister’s true preferences, which are associated with the 
‘higher’ preference F1, vary from F2 and up (e.g. to satisfy the condition that 
F1 >  F2)). Before passing point w′ the finance minister has an incentive to shield 
her preference, and the outcome depends on the spending minister’s prior beliefs. 
If the spending minister’s priors are such that it wants to avoid making a mistake, 
it will select x =  f2(q). The deviation from the status quo is indicated in grey. For 
more risk-taking spending ministers, outcomes can be f1(q) or q, but these are, at 
best, the same as in the base-line game. From point w′ on separation occurs and 
outcomes are equal to those of the base-line game (see Fig. 2).
The analysis indicates that guarding types of finance ministers maintain the 
budget framework, as in the base-line game, while most accommodating types 
will not enforce the initial agreement as embedded in the status quo. Uncertainty 
does not affect outcomes in these cases. Uncertainty may make a difference when 
the finance minister prefers some adaptation of the budget framework, but to a 
much smaller extent than the spending minister. In that case, the finance min-
ister has an incentive to shield her true preference from the spending minister 
by communicating a rather ‘conservative’ preference, which helps in maintain-
ing some spending discipline and limiting the deviations from the budget ceiling. 
This leads to the following result:
Result 2 (Information induced, weak compliance) Under uncertainty, and if the 
finance minister prefers a relatively small deviations from the budget ceiling (e.g. 
the types are compromising, or one of the types is accommodating and the condition 










Fig. 3  Outcomes under uncertainty for different preferences of the finance minister (F)
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Compared to the base-line game, uncertainty may sometimes increase compli-
ance with a multi-annual framework. Uncertainty helps the finance minister the 
moment it prefers a limited adaptation of the budget ceiling while the spending min-
ister prefers a more substantial change. The effect is limited, and also depends on 
how the spending minister handles uncertainty. A more risk-taking spending minis-
ter may rightly guess the finance minister’s true preferences if it were type F1, would 
lead to outcomes similar to that of the base-line game. However, the flipside of this 
behavior is that, once in a while, the spending minister misestimates preferences 
leading to a rejection of the proposed budget.
5  The impact of transaction costs: reducing policy sensitivity
A second step in our search for compliance is to introduce transaction costs that 
may affect the finance minister’s willingness to change. Not being able to maintain 
a multi-annual framework may lead to a loss of reputation for the government and 
specifically the finance minister. The national central bank, other fiscal authorities, 
like the European Commission and the European Central Bank in the euro zone, and 
the financial markets will have less confidence in a government that appears to be 
unable to maintain earlier fiscal agreements. In addition, within the government, the 
position of the finance minister will be questioned. By following substantive policy 
preferences favoring some spending ministers over others, the finance minister runs 
the risk of losing her authority as the main political actor responsible for fiscal pol-
icy. This will weaken the position of the finance minister within the government and 
vis-a-vis the spending ministers. These two elements, reputation loss as well as loss 
of power can be perceived as costs to the finance minister.
Transaction costs will be taken as a fixed and positive cost,τ, associated with 
changing the status quo ante. This cost affects the finance minister’s utility func-
tion, which we rewrite as u′f (x) =  uf (x) − τ for x ≠ q (and u′f (x) =  uf (q) for x =  q). 
If the finance minister is allowed to make a move, she will only deviate from the 
status quo ante if the net benefit of a new proposal, x, is higher than this cost (e.g. 
uf(x)  −  uf(q)>  τ). Applied to the base-line model, the finance minister’s prefer-
ence set W can be replaced by W′ = {x|uf(x) − τ >  uf(q)}, reducing the number of 
instances for which this set is non-empty. Taking Δ as the resulting increment of τ 
on the outcome dimension X, the finance minister will maintain the budget ceiling q 
up to the point F =  q + Δ (instead of F =  q in Result 1), which broadens the range of 
points for which players comply with the budget framework.
Applied to the signaling model with uncertainty, transaction costs affect the 
occurrence of the different categories of finance minister preferences and spending 
minister responses. First, due to positive costs, we have a new category of ‘quasi-
guarding’ ministers g′ for q < F ≤  q + Δ. This type behaves like a guardian keeping 
the status quo ante. Second, costs may reduce the occurrence of a compromise type 
of finance minister, who has a preference F when q + Δ < F < w. If costs are substan-
tial, that is, Δ ≥  w − q, no compromising types exist. Finally, also accommodating 
types (e.g. F ≥  w) are affected: accommodating types will only approve the spend-
ing minister’s budget if Δ < S − q. If Δ ≥  S − q, costs are even higher than the utility 
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difference between the status quo and most preferred budget of the spending minis-
ter for any type of finance minister. In that case q will be the only outcome.
Concerning play, a similar logic applies as in the previous section substituting the 
finance minister’s utility function uf (x) with u′f (x). Next to changes in the categories 
of ministers, this change affects the condition for separation. Furthermore, the indif-
ference point f(q) is a point x for which uf (x) =  uf(q)+τ, which will be a point closer 
to F than in the model without costs.15
Figure 4 illustrates the impact of transaction costs: depending on the size of costs 
τ, more instances occur in which the finance minister does not have an incentive to 
change the status quo ante. Note that Δ is the resulting size of τ on X. In fact, trans-
action costs increase the boundary in which the finance minister will not accept a 
change of the status quo ante. Only ‘high spending’ finance ministers will support a 
spending minister by ‘adjusting’ the budget ceiling to the ministerial estimate. The 
grey area in Fig. 4 illustrates this, which is substantially smaller than in Figs. 1 and 
3. This is based on the following result:
Result 3 (Cost induced compliance) If transaction costs are positive, also compro-
mising and eventually accommodating types of finance ministers will maintain the 
budget ceiling q up to the point where the utility difference between the minister’s 









Fig. 4  Outcomes with transaction costs (Δ) for different preferences of the finance minister (F)
15  The strategically most interesting combination is {c,a}. For {c,a}, separation occurs when F1 ≥   w′ 
and cost is small enough (if Δ < w − q). See note 13 for equilibriums. For F1 < w′ and costs are small 
enough (if Δ < w − q), no separation occurs and the spending minister uses his priors (see note 14). For 
the other combinations, see Sect. 4.
16  To show this: see the definitions of types, which depend on Δ. Let F >   q and F − q ≤ Δ  < S − q 
(if Δ ≥   S − q costs are even higher than the spending minister’s most preferred budget). If the spend-
ing minister proposes x =   x*, the finance minister would accept if x*∈W  =  {x|uf (x) >   uf(q)}. Since 
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Of course, this positive relationship between costs and compliance also implies 
that the effectiveness of a multi-annual framework will be less as these costs are 
reduced.
6  The impact of prime minister involvement: unintended 
consequences
The last step in our analysis is to explore the impact of changing the sequence of 
play on compliance. We focus on the option that the bilateral negotiations require 
mediation and are expanded to include a third actor, namely the prime minister. In 
many systems with cabinet governments, the prime minister bears political responsi-
bility for government as a whole. When the finance minister and the spending min-
ister do not agree, the conflict can be ‘scaling up’ to the prime minister who makes 
a decision.
The sequence of play is changed such that the spending minister decides to 
involve the prime minister if the finance minister vetoes her proposal. In the last 
stage, the prime minister reviews the budget estimate x in view of ceiling q, as indi-
cated by the budget framework, and makes a final decision. The fact that the prime 
minister may overrule the finance minister changes the dynamic of the game. Know-
ing the prime minister’s ideal position, each player assesses whether involving the 
prime minister leads to a better outcome than sticking to the status quo ante, q. In 
this way, the ideal position of the prime minister M serves as the status quo post on 
which the spending minister and the finance minister determine their moves.
To analyze this game, let m be the prime minister. If the prime minister makes a 
move, he chooses a budget x =  M. Define the preference set of the finance minister 
as W′ = {x|uf(x) >   uf(M)}) and P′ = {x|us(x) >   us(M)} as this set of the spending 
minister; both sets take the status quo post as point of departure. The new game 
points at two strategically different situations.
The first is one in which the prime minister splits both other players, that is, 
the prime minister is found between the spending and finance ministers (that is 
W′∩P′ = ∅). Figure 5 illustrates this situation when the finance minister is located to 
the left of the prime minister (e.g. is a guardian or compromising type). In that case, 
prime minister involvement is the only way for the spending minister to obtain a bet-
ter outcome. The minister chooses, with the support of the prime minister, x =  M.17
The second situation is one in which the spending and finance ministers both pre-
fer a change away from the prime minister (that is W′∩P′ ≠ ∅). These are prefer-
ence configurations in Fig. 5 in which the finance minister and the spending minis-
ter are located to the right of the prime minister (e.g. the finance minister is either 
Δ ≥  F − q, τ ≥  uf(x) for ∀x∈W. As a result, W′ = ∅, so f chooses q (that is, f behaves as quasi-guarding). 
However, if F − q >  Δ, ∃x∈W for which τ < uf(x), so W′ ≠ ∅ and f accepts x*.
Footnote 16 (continued)
17  Equilibrium (x =   M, 1, M) if we impose a small cost on the spending minister when his proposal 
triggers a veto. Note that W′∩P′ = ∅ if F ≤   M∧S ≥   M, or F ≥   M∧S ≤   M, which equals the condition 
of Result 4. Otherwise, W′∩P′ ≠ ∅, which occurs if F,S < M or F,S >   M. For F,S >   M, x* equals S if 
S ≤  f(M), or f(M) if S >  f(M). These conditions imply that optimal offers are selected from the interval 
(M, f(M)] (for F,S < M the results mirror these conditions).
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compromising or accommodating). If the finance minister has preferences F ≥  w″, 
the spending minister proposes x =  S. However, if the finance minister has a prefer-
ence M < F < w″, x =  f(M) is the best the spending minister can propose.18
These outcomes are illustrated in Fig. 5. Clearly, when the prime minister does 
not have preferences equal to the status quo ante (and, in this case, prefers a slightly 
higher budget for the spending minister), the finance minister is not able to protect 
the status quo. Even a guardian finance minister is forced to accept a deviation from 
the budget framework, if the prime minister prefers higher budget levels. This obser-
vation is expressed by our following results:
Result 4 (Prime minister intervention) When players can involve the prime minister 
as a mediator in the budgetary process, this player will only maintain the budget 
ceiling q when this point equals her preference (i.e. M =  q) and her preference splits 
the other players (i.e. F < M < S or S < M < F).
The corollary of this result is:
Corollary (Prime minister driven noncompliance) When the prime minister prefers 










Fig. 5  Outcomes for prime minister (M) mediation for different preferences of the finance minister (F)
18  The critical point equals the point at which the finance minister is indifferent between the spending 
minister’s and the prime minister’s ideal point. For symmetrical utility functions w″ = 1/2(M + S).
19  For M >  q and S >  q, equilibrium outcomes will be M or x (see the equilibriums of this game). To 
determine that x cannot be q: (a) if F, S >  M, x will be larger than M, and cannot, by definition, equal 
q; (b) if F, S < M, x∈[f(M), M), which may include q depending on F (e.g. F < q or f(M) < q). Since M, 
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The non-compliance with the budget framework in a mediation game is illus-
trated with the larger grey area in Fig. 5, compared to basic game (Fig. 1) and the 
games with uncertainty and transaction costs (Figs. 3, 4). Political mediation has, 
based on our modeling, the unintended effect of making compliance with the budget 
framework more difficult. In addition, this game also emphasizes the importance of 
having rather similar preferences between the finance minister and the prime min-
ister. The importance of this similarity is supported by recent empirical findings. 
Jochimsen and Thomasius (2014: 400) report that the influence of the finance minis-
ter to reduce public debt in German states is strengthened if she and the prime min-
ister belong to the same party and have more similar preferences.
The mediation model can be extended with uncertainty so that spending minister 
may need to estimate the finance minister’s true preferences. As discussed before, 
the finance minister may have an incentive not to reveal her true preferences when 
the minister prefers f(M) to S.20 In that case, and using his prior belief, the spending 
minister may overestimate the finance minister’s preferences leading to outcome M 
(through a veto and an appeal). Also, the spending minister may underestimate these 
preferences and propose f2(M), which will be accepted.
7  Applications and conclusions
Exploring how political actors will comply with multi-annual budget frameworks, 
the paper provides insight into the conditions under which a finance minister is 
likely to support the status quo budget and comply with the agreed budget ceiling. 
As shown, compliance with this framework depends on the interplay between the 
preferences and types of key players, transaction costs, decision-making rules and 
uncertainty.
To summarize the results in a more concise manner, I will distinguish between 
two important preference profiles. The first one is majoritarian government, which 
consists of players with preferences that are very much alike, because they are affili-
ated with the same political party. In this profile, the prime minister and the finance 
minister have rather similar preferences, which resemble the agreement as embed-
ded in the budget framework. Furthermore, this type can be associated with guard-
ian or compromising preferences on the part of the finance minister as described in 
this paper. The second profile type is coalition government, which includes several 
political parties with rather different preferences. Ministerial posts are allocated to 
different political parties, especially the more important ones such as the position of 
S >  q, s selects his best (closest) proposal from [f(M), M), which is: (i) x =  S if S >  f(M): since, by defini-
tion, S >  q, x is not equal to q; (ii) x =  f(M) if S < f(M): since S >  q, it must be that f(M) >  q, so x cannot 
be q.
Footnote 19 (continued)

















M)) , the finance minister of 
type 2 prefers the proposal from type 1 and has no incentive to reveal her true preferences, and, in the 
same way as our model under uncertainty, different equilibriums may occur including the vetoing of the 
spending minister’s proposal when this minister would have preferred a different outcome.
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prime minister and finance minister. This type can be associated with accommodat-
ing types of preferences. I will also distinguish between different kinds of external 
‘shocks’, which affect the location of finance minister’s preference vis-à-vis the sta-
tus quo ante. A small shock means that the finance minister still prefers to main-
tain the status quo (e.g. F < q); in a case of a substantial shock this minister prefers 
budget levels beyond the status quo (F >  q).
The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 2. Departing from the base-
line model, the model with uncertainty introduces a spending minister who does not 
know the preferences of the finance minister. The transaction costs model experi-
ments with different levels of costs, which have a dampening effect on the behavior 
of the finance minister. The political mediation model introduces the prime minister 
as a third player in the budgetary process, which changes the focus from the sta-
tus quo ante to the prime minister’s ideal position as the status quo post. In case 
of a small shock, the finance minister is able to protect status quo ante against the 
demands of the spending minister in most models (see Table 2a). The framework 
helps as a tool to constrain public expenditure and to avoid higher spending. An 
exception occurs for the political mediation model in the context of coalition gov-
ernments: since, in this case, the prime minister is assumed to have difference pref-
erences than the finance minister, the outcome of the decision-making process is 
found to be equal to the prime-minister’s preference. This adverse effect on compli-
ance is the result of scaling up a conflict to the prime minister, which changes the 
point of departure of the game from the status quo ante to a new status quo post.
In case of a substantial shock, after which players prefer a higher spending level 
than before, the results suggest that compliance with multi-annual frameworks will 
be less (see Table 2b). The only model that may reduce the incentive to set a higher 
budget is the transaction costs model. If these costs are high enough to the finance 
minister to offset the benefits of increasing the budget, this player will continue to 
maintain the status quo ante. The models with uncertainty as well as political media-
tion mostly produce outcomes that are associated with higher budget levels, indicat-
ing that under these conditions budget frameworks are not able to constrain spend-
ing. Another interesting effect is that majoritarian governments, if there is a need to 
Table 2  Compliance with multi-annual budget frameworks under different arrangements
2a
2b
Key: q = status quo ante; F = the ideal position of the finance minister; M = ideal position prime minister; 
S = ideal position spending minister; f(q) = indifference point to q of the finance minister; f(M) = indif-
ference point to M of the finance minister; f2(q) = indifference point to q of a type 2 finance minister. In 
addition, note that, q < f2(q) ≤  f(q) < S, and q < M < f(M) in case of a substantial shock (Table 2b) or for a 
coalition government (Table 2a and 2b)
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change the status quo ante, mostly will do better in limiting overspending. This is a 
result of the more homogenous preferences of these governments.
The findings illustrate that multi-year or multi-annual budget frameworks only 
have a conditional effect on government spending based on the explored relation-
ships between preferences, costs, rules and uncertainty. Their effectiveness depends 
on the size of external shocks, but also on the political context. In relatively sta-
ble economic circumstances, governments are able to comply with budget frame-
works, even if there is some preference heterogeneity within the government. Under 
more fragile economic conditions, compliance mainly depends on preferences and 
costs. Only strong preference homogeneity that supports the status quo budget or 
high transaction costs tend to yield budgets that comply with a previously adopted 
budget ceiling. In all other cases, the initial agreement as embedded in the budget 
framework will no longer be supported, leading to noncompliance and increases in 
expenditures.
The endogeneity of budgetary rules implies that they cannot be ‘absolute’ con-
straints on future budgetary negotiations. Budgetary ceilings are elastic, and the 
extent to which a ceiling may be stretched is the result of its interplay with the other 
behavioral factors (e.g. preferences, costs and uncertainty). Given this, studies that 
focus on the structural or procedural features of political systems (Ardanaz and 
Scartascini 2014; Caruso et  al. 2015; Persson and Tabellini 2003) or that simply 
focus on explore the determinants of finance minister’s preferences (Jochimsen and 
Thomasius 2014; Chatagny 2015; Moessinger 2014) are ignoring important interde-
pendencies between fiscal institutions and preferences.
Our analysis suggests connecting rules and preferences sheds better light on the 
political character of budgetary decision-making. Although, increasing transaction 
costs can limit political enthusiasm for renegotiating earlier agreements and thus 
help preserve the ceilings set by a budget framework, they are not always sufficient 
to buttress earlier budgetary agreements. Such costs may be increased if they are 
given greater prominence and visibility through the media, so that voters and inter-
est groups are more aware of existing expenditure rules. Similarly, given such agree-
ments greater attention may help to increase the costs of breaking earlier commit-
ments (Brennan and Buchanan 1980: 202–3).
Budgetary decision-making remains inherently political. For that reason, effec-
tive constraints to budgetary processes have to be political as well.
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